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ABSTRACT
Although ‘Cap-and-trade’ mainly constrains the manufacturer, the decision of the manufacturer’s
emission reduction will affect the decision of the whole supply chain. In this paper, we investigate
manufacturer and retailer’s decision under decentralized decision and centralized decision and tak-
ing into account the impact of carbon price and consumer environmental consciousness. Specially,
we analyse the condition of whether amanufacturer transfers the emission reduction task to retailer.
Besides, we use computational experiments to analyse the sensitivity by changing the cost func-
tion. Through the research, we have some findings: under a decentralized decision, manufacturer
transfers emissions reduction task in more times, if the manufacturer transfers the emissions reduc-
tion task, the effectiveness of the emissions reduction, demand, retailer’s revenue per product and
consumer welfare decrease. Under centralized decision, the manufacturer does not transfer emis-
sions reduction task all time, which is affected by emissions reduction cost of the manufacturer and
retailer, carbon price and consumer environmental consciousness. In addition, emissions reduction
cost function is not the sensitivity factor.
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1. Introduction
In the face of both academic and practitioner con-
cerns about greenhouse gas as a major contributor to
global warming, the EU and other countries have estab-
lished various regulations to control carbon emissions.
Governments have also supplemented traditional ‘com-
mand and control’ with market-based instruments (Aidt
& Dutta, 2004), the most influential of which is the ‘cap-
and-trade’ system whereby the government allocates a
carbon emissions cap to each firm. If the company’s car-
bonemissions exceed this cap, itmust buy thequota from
the market; if they are lower than the cap, it can sell the
surfeit on the market. Although such a system may be a
key point to ease the environmental burden and possibly
be a basic module of future climate policy (Stern, 2008),
it has a definite effect on firms’ operational decisions (Du,
Zhu, Liang, & Ma, 2013) and region selection (Wu, Jin, Shi,
& Shyu, 2018).
The firm’s decision of emissions reduction is also influ-
enced by consumers’ environmental consciousness: the
growing number of consumers who are aware of prod-
ucts’ environmental impacts and opt for greener choices
constrains firms’ negative environmental externality. If a
CONTACT Yunlong Liu longyun768@126.com; Qiankun Song qiankunsong@163.com
product’s emission is high, a firm’s social responsibility is
low, and it can expect consumer punishment from pro-
duction through sale; for example, by paying a high price
to attract and motivate employees, which raises produc-
tion costs and impacts sales (Heyes & Kapur, 2012). If
the product is green, on the other hand, because of the
consumer’s environment preference, consumer demand
is linked with carbon emissions of per product unit (Li
et al., 2018), consumers may be willing to pay a premium
price (Arora & Gangopadhyay, 1995), which means that
themanufacturer’s efforts to reduce carbon emissions are
also enjoyed by the retailer, who becomes a free rider. As
a result, some firms are calling for other stakeholders to
also reduce related carbon emissions so as to lower emis-
sions overall. Nike, for instance, has reported that it will
focus on the energy footprint of its retail channel (NIKE,
FY07-FY09).
The literature relevant to this research primarily comes
from three streams: (i) green supply chain design focused
on optimizing the carbon footprint in a product’s whole
life cycle (Benjaafar, Li, & Daskin, 2013; Chaabane, Ramud-
hin, & Paquet, 2012; Hoen, Tan, Fransoo, & Houtum, 2014;
Mohammed, Selim, Hassan, & Syed, 2017), (ii) the impact
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
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on supply chains of environmental policy (e.g. carbon
taxes, carbon disclosure, and ‘cap-and-trade’ systems)
(Bazan, Jaber, & Zanoni, 2017; Fischer & Springborn, 2011;
Hoen et al., 2014; Mackenzie & Ohndorf, 2012; Song,
Govindan, Xu, Du, & Qiao, 2017), and (iii) the impact on
supply chains of corporate social responsibility and con-
sumer environmental consciousness (Geffen & Rothen-
berg, 2000; Laroche, Bergeron, & Guido, 2001; Liu, Ander-
son, & Cruz, 2012; O’brien, 1999; Sarkis, Zhu, & Lai, 2011;
Sengupta, 2012; Yalabik & Fairchild, 2011; Zhu & Sarkis,
2007).
Yet, despite these emerging trends, little academic lit-
erature addresses the joint reduction of carbon emissions
along the supply chain and/or the allocation of reduc-
tion tasks among different partners. To help fill this void,
we develop a theoretical gamemodel for analysing these
factors in what, to the best of our knowledge, is the first
paper on joint emissions reduction in the supply chain.
Our model captures three characteristics of a low-
carbon supply chain: First, consumer choices based
on environmental consciousness force manufacturers to
reduce their carbon emissions. Second, such reduction
can increase demand, which can also benefit the retailer,
which means that manufacturers may transfer some
emission reduction task to retailers (Caro, Corbett, Tan, &
Zuidwijk, 2011). Third, this convenient transfer, referred
to as ‘green wash’ in the literature, is facilitated by the
fact that emissions from transportation and inventory
make up a large portion of the product’s whole life cycle
(Cachon, 2011). Our game model therefore focuses on
the whole supply chain and, unlike the many studies that
investigate emissions reduction by firms only, assumes
that themanufacturer can transfer all or part of the carbon
emissions reduction task to the retailer.
Our overall contributions are therefore twofold: First,
our model not only considers the decision of joint emis-
sions reduction of the whole supply chain under a car-
bon price constraint but also compares these decisions
under both a decentralized and a centralized mode. Sec-
ond, our paper focuses heavily on how carbon price and
consumer environmental consciousness affect a manu-
facturer’s decision, an aspect little studied in the related
literature.
2. Problem description andmodel assumptions
In this paper, we study a two-echelon supply chain with
one dominant manufacturer who can control the sup-
ply chain and one retailer (see Figure 1). In the pres-
ence of policy and consumer pressure, the manufacturer
always ascertains and declares a goal of emissions reduc-
tion in order to signal its corporate social responsibility
and attract more consumers. That is, the manufacturer
Figure 1. Emissions allocation in a low-carbon supply chain.
informs consumers that theperproduct carbonemissions
will be reduced from E0 to E. The decision sequence is as
follows: The manufacturer first decides the optimal emis-
sions E associated with the product, the proportion of
emissions reduction task allocated to the retailer β , and
thewholesalepricew, basedonwhich the retailer decides
the retail price p.
Under the cap-and-trade system, the government sets
an emissions cap Ecap. If the firm’s total emissions exceed
this limit, the excessmust be bought on themarket; if not,
the surfeit can be sold on the market. Since the carbon
price is beyond the company’s control, we assume that
it is an exogenous variable denoted by pc. In our analy-
sis, although in current practice the cap-and-trade system
applies mainly to manufacturers, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 2.1: The manufacturer can allocate part but
not all of the emissions reduction goal to the retailer, mak-
ing the retailer’s portion α ∈ [0, 1) and the manufacturer’s
portion β ∈ (0, 1].
The rationale underlying this assumption is that the
entire supply chain should be responsible for the over-
all emissions not simply the supply chain leader (Caro
et al., 2011). And some other literature reveals that there
exists greenwashing in a green supply chain (Eun-Hee
& Thomas, 2011). It is therefore reasonable to assume
that the retailer has a part in the emissions reduction;
for example, by reducing the emissions during inventory
and transportation. If the manufacturer (retailer) were to
undertake all emissions reduction, then α = 0 and β = 1
(α = 1 and β = 0); however, this situation is rare in prac-
tice, so we omit these scenarios. We also assume that the
manufacturer and retailer havedifferentmarginal costs of
dealing with emissions reduction and express the manu-
facturer’s marginal cost as t, with a linear function Cc =
tβ(E0 − E), and the retailer’s as s,with linear function Cr =
sα(E0 − E). This assumption is general enough to give
our model the flexibility to capture different situations. In
some cases, the retailer cannot reduce the product’s car-
bon emissions directly but must still bear some related
cost, which corresponds to the case of t = s. Although
this linear cost function assumption may seem a little
strict, our numerical experiment shows that our results
are highly robust to it.
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The research also provides clear evidence that when
consumers’ environmental consciousness increases, car-
bon emissions have a negative effect on demand, which
leads to our second assumption:
Assumption 2.2: The demand function decreases with an
increase in emissions per product unit or price.
In this case, following (Yalabik & Fairchild, 2011), the
demand function can be given as
Q = a − p − kE (1)
whereQ is thedemand,a is thepotentialmarket, and k is a
coefficient denoting consumer sensitivity to carbon emis-
sions. In the presence of an environmentally conscious
consumer, however, if the emissions are high, consumer
demand will decrease, so the retailer will appreciate the
manufacturer’s reducing the carbon emissions per prod-
uct unit. Some literatures give the conclusion through
their studies (Heyes & Kapur, 2012; Li et al., 2018; Yalabik &
Fairchild, 2011), but some research thinks that consumer
are concernedwithpricemore than carbonemissions. For
example, the BIS(2010) report indicates that consumers
paymoreattention to cost savings thancarbonemissions.
In terms of manufacturer’s cost, assume the following:
Assumption 2.3: The manufacturer’s cost is made up of
two parts: production cost Cm, which is assumed to be a
constant, and emissions-related costs, which include the
reduction cost Cc and the carbon quota purchasing cost
pc(EQ − Ecap).
The variable cost of manufacturing, besides being
affected by production quantity, is also affected by
demand when price or emissions per product unit
change. We eliminate this effect by adding pc(EQ − Ecap)
to the revenue function, allowing us to focus primarily
on the cost of emissions reduction. To simplify the calcu-
lation, we write the cost of emissions reduction as Cr =
sαEr = sα(E0 − E) and the manufacturing cost as Cc =
tβ(E0 − E), whose potential effect on the revenue func-
tion we neutralize through a subsequent analysis of cost
sensitivity. Since a constant variable cost does not change
our results,weassumea constant production cost equiva-
lent to zero variable production cost, allowing us tomake
the above assumption without loss of generality. The
notations used in the model are summarized in Table 1.
Within this modelling framework, we can write from
Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 that the retailer’s and manu-
facturer’s revenue functions are as follows: the retailer’s
Table 1. Model notations.
Symbol Definition
Q Consumer demand
p Retail price
k Market sensitivity to the emissions of the firm’s product
Cr Retailer’s cost of dealing with the emissions
Cm Manufacturing cost
w Wholesale price
Cc Manufacturer’s cost of emissions reduction
pc Carbon price
Ecap Emissions cap
α Proportion undertaken by the retailer
β Proportion undertaken by the manufacturer
E Emissions per product unit
E0 Original emissions per product unit
Er Quantity of emissions reduction
s Retailer’s treatment cost for emissions per unit
t Manufacturer’s treatment cost for emissions per unit
revenue function is
r(p) = pQ − wQ − Cr
= (p − w)(a − p − kE) − sα(E0 − E), (2)
and the manufacturer’s revenue function is
m(w, E) = wQ − Cm − Cc − pc(EQ − Ecap). (3)
Under a cap-and-trade system, when EQ > Ecap (i.e.
when emissions are higher than the cap), the manufac-
turer must buy the excess on the market, whereas when
EQ < Ecap (i.e. when emissions are lower than the cap),
the manufacturer can sell the surfeit on the trade market
and earn extra benefits.
3. Analysis
To examine the condition under which the retailer will
undertake a portion of the emissions reduction, we use
backward induction to solve the model and achieve a
Stackelberg game Nash equilibrium between the man-
ufacturer and retailer in the supply chain. We also con-
sider the opposite condition (α = 0) as a special case.
To increase the number of insights, we analyse both the
decentralized and centralized decision model.
3.1. Decentralized decisionmodel
Under a condition of decentralized decisions, from (1),
(2) and (3), we can get that the optimal decisions for the
manufacturer and retailer are thus
E∗ = a(pc + k) − 4tβd
(pc + k)2
, (4)
w∗ = pca(pc + k) − 2tβd(pc − k)
(pc + k)2
, (5)
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p∗ = pca(k + pc) − tβd(pc − 3k)
(pc + k)2
, (6)
Q∗ = tβd
pc + k . (7)
When the retailer undertakes no portion of the emis-
sions reduction, the optimal decision is
E0 = a(pc + k) − 4t
(pc + k)2
, (8)
w0 = pca(pc + k) − 2t(pc − k)
(pc + k)2
, (9)
p0 = pca(k + pc) − t(pc − 3k)
(pc + k)2
, (10)
Q0 = t
pc + k . (11)
In the following, we analyse the manufacturer’s strat-
egy for allocating the emissions reduction task, which
yields the following results:
Theorem 3.1: The manufacturer’s emissions reduction
allocation strategy is as follows:
(i) If a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
≤ pc + k ≤ a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
,
then∗m ≤ 0m,
(ii) If a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
< pc + k < aE0 or 0 < pc + k <
a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
, then∗m > 0m,
where ∗m = atβd(pc+k)−2(tβd)
2
(pc+k)2 − Cm + pcEcap − tβdE0,
which denotes the manufacturer’s revenue when the man-
ufacturer undertakes the whole emissions reduction and
transfers to the retailer,0m = at(pc+k)−2t
2
(pc+k)2 − Cm + pcEcap −
tE0, which denotes the manufacturer’s revenue when the
manufacturer undertakes the whole emissions reduction
and transfers none to the retailer.
For the proof, see the appendix.
Theorem 3.1 also suggests that when the sum pc + k
of the carbon price pc and consumer sensitivity k is very
low, reducing carbon emissions results in increased cost,
meaning that the manufacturer gains little benefit from
selling either the emissions quota or environmentally
friendly products. In that case, the manufacturer has no
incentive to eliminate emissions and will transfer the task
to the retailer. When the carbon price and consumer sen-
sitivity pressure is high, the manufacturer should avoid
the high carbon price penalty by reducing carbon emis-
sions andpassing the related costs onto the consumer. As
this pressure increases, however, the manufacturer faces
a high penalty for further eliminating carbon emissions
and cannot pass the cost on to the consumer because
the higher price may result in less demand. In this case,
themanufacturer can allocate the emissions reduction so
that the retailer shares the cost (see Yalabik & Fairchild,
2011). So, government should establish the threshold of
the carbon price to promote the manufacturer to invest
technology to reduce carbon emission of per product
unit.
Theorem 3.2: Under a decentralized decision, if the man-
ufacturer decides to transfer part 1 − βd of the emissions
reduction task, the effectiveness of the emissions reduction,
E, demand, Q, retailer’s revenue per product, p − w, and
consumer welfare,
∫ Q
0 (a − Q − kE)dQ, all decrease.
For the proof, see the appendix.
According to Theorem 3.1, if the manufacturer trans-
fers the emissions reduction under a decentralized deci-
sion, both retailer revenue and activity decrease, which
may result in decreased demand. As a result, the overall
emissions, EQ, decrease, which means that the manufac-
turer does not invest more in technology. For instance,
when a number of emissions credits are available in the
carbon market (as in the EU), the carbon price can plum-
met to a record low, leading many firms to buy emis-
sions credits instead of investing in environmental tech-
nology. Moreover, effective emissions reduction implies
that emissions per product are high, so not only p − w
and consumerwelfare but also demanddecreases, affect-
ing both the retail and wholesale price. From Theorem
3.2, we can know that the policy of cap of total emission
associated with the policy of carbon disclosure is better.
3.2. Centralized decisionmodel
To examine conditions under a centralized decision, we
consider emissions and revenue in the entire supply
chain. According to Assumption 2.2, the consumer is will-
ing to pay a premium on low-carbon products, which
means that both emissions and price affect demand and
the supplier can transfer the emissions reduction cost
to the consumer (Cachon, 2011). In the centralized deci-
sion mode, therefore, we must consider the price of
revenue-integrating product and emissions per product.
Because α ∈ [0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1] in Assumption 2.1, we
also assume the following revenue function, in which we
consider α = 0 and β = 1as a special condition:
t = pQ − Cr − Cm − Cc − pc(EQ − Ecap). (12)
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The optimal decision in the centralized control mode,
therefore, is
E∗t =
a(pc + k) − 2(sαc + tβc)
(pc + k)2
, (13)
p∗t =
pca(pc + k) − (pc − k)(sαc + tβc)
(pc + k)2
, (14)
Q∗t =
sαc + tβc
pc + k . (15)
Theorem3.3: Under themanufacturerwhochoosesa cen-
tralized control mode, the optimal decision is as follows:
(i) If a−
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
< pc + k ≤ a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
or a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
≤ pc + k < a+
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
for t> s, then the manufac-
turer transfers the emissions reduction to the retailer,
βc = a(pc + k) − E0(pc + k)
2 − 2s
2(t − s) ,
and the optimal revenue is
∗∏
t
= E
2
0(pc + k)2 − 2E0(pc + k)
4
+ 2a − a
2
4
+ pcEcap − Cm.
(ii) If a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
≤ pc + k < a−
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
or a+
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
< pc + k ≤ a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
for t> s, then the manufac-
turer transfers the emissions reduction to the retailer,
βc = a(pc + k) − E0(pc + k)
2 − 2s
2(t − s) ,
and the optimal revenue is
∗∏
t
= E
2
0(pc + k)2 − 2E0(pc + k)
4
+ 2a − a
2
4
+ pcEcap − Cm.
(iii) When t = s, nomatterwhat theproportionof emissions
reduction allocated, the revenue under a centralized
decision is
∗∏
t
= at(pc + k) − t
2
(pc + k)2
− tE0 + pcEcap − Cm.
For the proof, see the appendix.
4. Numerical example
For our numerical example, we perform a sensitivity anal-
ysis of the emissions reduction cost function. We test
whether our original results are robust by changing the
linear emissions reduction cost function into a quadratic
one.
In the above,wehave considered the case that the cost
of emissions reduction as Cr = sα(E0 − E) and the manu-
facturing cost as Cc = tβ(E0 − E). If the cost of emissions
reduction Cr and the manufacturing cost Cc are consid-
ered as Cr = sα2(E0 − E)2 and Cc = tβ2(E0 − E)2, respec-
tively, then the manufacturer’s revenue given transfer
and non-transfer of the emissions reduction task, respec-
tively, are
∗∏
m0
(w, E) = 8t
2(pcE0 + kE0 − a)2
[(pc + k)2 − 8t]2
− Cm
− t
(
E0 − a(pc + k) − 8tE0
(pc + k)2 − 8t
)2
+ pcEcap,
and
∗∏
m
(w, E) = 8t
2β2(pcE0 + kE0 − a)2
[(pc + k)2 − 8tβ]2
− Cm
− tβ
(
E0 − a(pc + k) − 8tβE0
(pc + k)2 − 8tβ
)2
+ pcEcap.
From above mathematical deduction, we know that it
is difficult to analyse the decentralized decision and cen-
tralized decision. In the following, we use simulation to
analyse the functional sensitivity.
Setting a = 600, t = 20, E0 = 55, Cm = 100, β = 0.6,
Ecap = 40, Pc = 12 and k = 12 which refers to (Subrama-
nian, Gupta, & Talbot, 2007), then the simulation status
of the manufacturer’s optimal revenue is shown in Fig-
ures 2 and 3, where Figure 2 shows that the comparison
of the revenue between carbon emissions transfer and
no transfer, while Figure 3 shows the optimal revenue
no matter whether the manufacturer transfers emissions
or not. From Figure 2, we clearly see that
∏∗
m ≤
∏∗
m0
when a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
≤ pc + k ≤ a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
and∗m > 0m
holds too when a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
< pc + k < aE0 or 0 < pc +
k < a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
. So, it demonstrates that the emissions
cost assumption in the model assumption is rational.
With regard to the manufacturer’s revenue, when the
carbon price and consumer penalty pressure are low,
their impact is almost negligible, so the manufacturer’s
revenue is high. With these constraints increasing, even
though the manufacturer transfers part of the emis-
sions burden to the retailer, the manufacturer’s cost also
increases and revenuedecreases. If the pressure increases
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Figure 2. Optimal manufacturer’s revenue given Emissions bur-
den transfer or non-transfer for a certain pc + k.
Figure 3. Manufacturer’s revenue under the optimal decision.
further, but the manufacturer still transfers the emissions
burden to the retailer, the retailer’s revenue is so low
that it may have no desire to be an agent for the prod-
uct, which also impacts the manufacturer’s revenue. In
this case, the manufacturer’s strategy is to use price to
transfer the cost to the consumer. As Figure 2 illustrates,
however, the carbon price and consumer environmen-
tal consciousness pressures are seldom too small or too
large, so most of the time, the manufacturer transfers the
emissions reduction to the retailer.
5. Conclusions
By analysing the decision of one manufacturer and one
retailer under carbon price and consumer environmental
consciousness constraints, we offer several important
insights into the allocation of carbon emissions reduction
and how such decisions affect the consumer. One major
finding is that, when the carbon price and consumer con-
sciousness constraints are present in certain intervals, a
centralized decision is better than a decentralized deci-
sion and, in most cases, it is the optimal manufacturer
choice. Nonetheless, even when choosing this mode, the
manufacturer is likely to transfer part of the emissions
reduction to the retailer, so that, even though demand
and consumer welfare increases in the centralized mode,
the emissions reduction effectiveness is the same as that
in the decentralizedmode. Our analysis also points to the
following conclusions:
(1) Under the decentralized decision, whether the man-
ufacturer transfers emission to the retailer which
depends on the scope of values of the constraint
of carbon price and consumer, in some conditions,
the manufacturer is willing to undertake the whole
allocation of emission reduction. And the initia-
tive of emission reduction is not always increasing
with the high constraint of carbon price and con-
sumer, according to Theorem 3.1, when the pressure
from the carbon price and consumer consciousness
exceeds a certain level, the manufacturer’s motiva-
tion to reduce emissions decreases.
(2) Under the decentralized decision, the manufacturer
transfers emissions reduction to the retailer and
both demand and consumerwelfare decrease, which
bears out (Carmona, Fehr, Hinz, & Porchet, 2010; Sub-
ramanianet al., 2007) claim that the socially optimal is
not always good for the consumer. That is, by under-
takingemissions reduction, nomatter towhat extent,
the retailer suffers a loss of revenue, so the amount of
emissions reduction undertaken has a baseline.
(3) Even though the effectiveness of emissions reduc-
tion is the same under both a centralized and decen-
tralized decision, demand and consumer welfare is
higher under the former. Moreover, when the man-
ufacturer undertakes the entire emissions reduction,
there is no improvement in the reduction’s effective-
ness in either the centralized or decentralized deci-
sion, because the entire supply chain collectively is
subject to an emissions cap that constrains only one
firm.
(4) Under a centralized decision, a firm considers not
only the emissions cost but also its price strategy,
enough concern about the minimum cost of emis-
sions reduction may result in decreased demand
and prices and thus a reduction in gross revenue. In
fact, the BIS(2010) report indicates that consumers
pay more attention to cost savings than carbon
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emissions, which means that even low-carbon prod-
ucts require the use of a price strategy. Thus,
although a centralized decision is good for the man-
ufacturer and consumer, it is not beneficial for the
environment.
The demand function in our paper could be affected
by consumer preference. In the future, the study will con-
sider the stochasticdemandof themodel and theeffect of
threshold of carbonprice on themanufacturer’s decision.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Substituting (4), (5), (6) and (7) into (2)
and (3) yields
∗r = (tβd)
2
(pc+k)2 − sαd(E0 − E)
= (t2+4st)βd2−4stβd−sa(pc+k)βd+sa(pc+k)
(pc+k)2 + sE0βd − sE0,
(A1)
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and
∗m =
atβd(pc + k) − 2(tβd)2
(pc + k)2
− Cm + pcEcap − tβdE0. (A2)
Substituting (8), (9), (10) and (11) into (2) and (3) gives
0r =
t2
(pc + k)2
, (A3)
and
0m =
at(pc + k) − 2t2
(pc + k)2
− Cm + pcEcap − tE0. (A4)
Hence
∗m − 0m =
t(1 − βd)[E0(pc + k)2 − a(pc + k) + 2t(1 + βd)]
(pc + k)2
.
(i) When a−
√
a2−8tE0(1−βd)
2E0
≤ pc + k ≤ a+
√
a2−8tE0(1−βd)
2E0
, we
have from Assumption 2.1 that
∗m ≤ 0m.
(ii) When a+
√
a2−8tE0(1−βd)
2E0
< pc + k or 0 < pc + k <
a−
√
a2−8tE0(1−βd)
2E0
, we get from Assumption 2.1 that
∗m > 
0
m.
The proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2: According to (4) and (8), we can obtain
that
E∗ − E0 = 4t − 4tβd
(pc + k)2
= 4t(1 − βd)
(pc + k)2
≥ 0,
hence
E∗ ≥ E0.
According to (7) and (11), we can get that
Q∗ − Q0 = − t(1 − βd)
pc + k ≤ 0,
therefore
Q∗ ≤ Q0.
According to (5) and (6), when the retailer undertakes the emis-
sions reduction, its revenue per product unit is
p∗ − w∗ = tβd
pc + k .
According to (9) and (10), when the retailer undertakes no emis-
sions reduction, its revenue per unit product is
p0 − w0 = t
pc + k .
Hence
(p∗ − w∗) − (p0 − w0) = − t(1 − βd)
pc + k < 0.
When the retailer under takes emissions reduction, consumer
welfare can be written as∫ Q∗
0
(a − Q − kE∗)dQ = 1
2
(Q∗)2 = (tβd)
2
2(pc + k)2
. (A5)
When it does not, consumer welfare can be expressed as
∫ Q0
0
(a − Q − kE0)dQ = 1
2
(Q0)2 = t
2
2(pc + k)2
. (A6)
A comparison of (A5) and (A6) shows that if the manufac-
turer decides to transfer the emissions reduction to the retailer,
consumer welfare decreases.
The proof is complete. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Substituting (13), (14) and (15) into (12)
yields
∗∏
t
= a(pc + k)(sαc + tβc) − (sαc + tβc)
2
(pc + k)2
− (sαc + tβc)E0 + pcEcap − Cm. (A7)
Let X = sαc + tβc , then
∏∗
t = a(pc+k)X−X
2
(pc+k)2 − XE0 + pcEcap −
Cm.
It is easy to compute that
d2
∏∗
t
dX2
< 0.
Hence,
∏∗
t has a maximum. Let
d∗t
dX = 0,which yields
X = a(pc + k) − E0(pc + k)
2
2
= (sαc + tβc). (A8)
So,
βc = a(pc + k) − E0(pc + k)
2 − 2s
2(t − s) . (A9)
It follows from 0 < βc ≤ 1that
0 <
a(pc + k) − E0(pc + k)2 − 2s
2(t − s) ≤ 1. (A10)
(i) If a−
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
< pc + k ≤ a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
or a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
≤ pc
+ k < a+
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
for t > s, thenwecanget from (A10) that
the optimal revenue is
∗∏
t
= E
2
0(pc + k)2 − 2E0(pc + k)
4
+ 2a − a
2
4
+ pcEcap − Cm.
(ii) If a−
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
≤ pc + k < a−
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
or a+
√
a2−8sE0
2E0
< pc
+ k ≤ a+
√
a2−8tE0
2E0
for t > s, thenwe canget from (A10) that
the optimal revenue is
∗∏
t
= E
2
0(pc + k)2 − 2E0(pc + k)
4
+ 2a − a
2
4
+ pcEcap − Cm.
(iii) When t = s, we can get from (A10) that centralized decision
revenue is
∗∏
t
= at(pc + k) − t
2
(pc + k)2
− tE0 + pcEcap − Cm.
The proof is complete. 
